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Abstract—An attack graph is a method used to enumerate the
possible paths that an attacker can execute in the organization
network. MulVAL is a known open-source framework used to
automatically generate attack graphs. MulVAL’s default model-
ing has two main shortcomings. First, it lacks the representation
of network protocol vulnerabilities, and thus it cannot be used
to model common network attacks such as ARP poisoning, DNS
spoofing, and SYN flooding. Second, it does not support advanced
types of communication such as wireless and bus communication,
and thus it cannot be used to model cyber-attacks on networks
that include IoT devices or industrial components. In this paper,
we present an extended network security model for MulVAL
that: (1) considers the physical network topology, (2) supports
short-range communication protocols (e.g., Bluetooth), (3) models
vulnerabilities in the design of network protocols, and (4)
models specific industrial communication architectures. Using
the proposed extensions, we were able to model multiple attack
techniques including: spoofing, man-in-the-middle, and denial of
service, as well as attacks on advanced types of communication.
We demonstrate the proposed model on a testbed implementing
a simplified network architecture comprised of both IT and
industrial components.
Index Terms—Attack Graph, MulVAL, Network Protocols,
Network attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment is a process that enables system stake-
holders to assess the risks to their system and select suitable
countermeasures. An attack graph is a risk assessment method
used to enumerate the possible attack paths that an attacker can
take in order to compromise an organization [1]. This is done
by modeling the prerequisites and consequences of exploiting
software vulnerabilities, as well as the attacker’s potential lat-
eral movements. Using attack graphs, system stakeholders can
identify potential attack paths, assess their risk, visualize an
exhaustive attack surface, and plan efficient countermeasures.
Various types of attack graphs have been proposed in the
literature, including state attack graphs [2], dependency attack
graphs [3], multi-prerequisite graphs [4], and logical attack
graphs [5]. In this research, we focus on the logical attack
graph: a directed and-or graph in which the root represents an
attacker’s goal, nodes represent subgoals (attack steps), and
leafs represent facts about the system. Both facts and subgoals
can be disjunctively or conjunctively connected to the next
subgoals or a final goal.
MulVAL, a logic-based network security analyzer [6], is
a well-known open-source framework for automatically con-
structing attack graphs. MulVAL models the interactions of
software vulnerabilities with system and network configura-
tions, while automatically extracting information from formal
vulnerability databases (such as the National Vulnerability
Database – NVD [7]) and network scanning tools (such as
Nessus [8]).
While the MulVAL framework is a very powerful tool
for generating attack graphs, it currently suffers from the
following major limitations. First, it is broadly focused on
application (software) vulnerabilities and does not properly
incorporate weaknesses in network architectures and proto-
cols. For instance, ARP poisoning, DNS spoofing, and SYN
flooding are network attacks that cannot be properly modeled
using only application vulnerabilities. Thus, MulVAL is likely
to create an incomplete view of the possible attacks and
attack paths in an organizational network. Second, MulVAL
is specifically designed to model traditional IT environments
and does not support advanced communication types such as
wireless and bus communication. Thus, it cannot be used to
model cyber-attacks on modern enterprise networks, such as
those that include IoT or industrial components.
Previous attempts to augment MulVAL for representing
vulnerabilities in network protocols did not provide a compre-
hensive (general) network model but addressed and modeled
specific network attacks (e.g., ARP poisoning in [9]). In this
paper we extend the MulVAL framework with a compre-
hensive network modeling. The proposed extension considers
the seven layers of the OSI network model (including the
physical network topology), supports short-range communica-
tion protocols which are very common in IoT environments,
and models specific industrial communication architectures.
Consequently, the extended version of MulVAL supports the
modeling of various network attacks, including attacks on the
physical layer (e.g., bus spoofing, WEP cracking, Bluetooth
PIN cracking), data link layer (e.g., ARP poisoning), network
layer (e.g., IP spoofing, ICMP flooding), and application layer
(e.g., DNS spoofing). We demonstrated the proposed modeling
in a testbed implementing a simplified network architecture,
which is comprised of both IT and industrial components.
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Finally, in order to maintain an end-to-end attack graph gen-
eration process (that is provided by the MulVAL framework),
we present our dedicated agent that was implemented for
automatically scanning the network and translating the scan
results into our extended modeling.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as
follows. First, we present comprehensive network modeling
that considers the seven layers of the OSI network model
(including the physical network topology, wireless networks
and bus architecture), which are currently not supported by
the MulVAL framework. Second, we model multiple attack
scenarios that are not addressed by current attack graph
frameworks (e.g., spoofing and wireless attacks). Third, we
present the implementation of a dedicated agent which is used
to automatically collect network configurations and generate
the input for the extended model.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. The Evolution of Attack Graph Generation Methods
Forward exploration for attack graph generation. The
use of attack graphs for security assessment started almost
30 years ago. Fundamental studies in this domain include
the works of Philips and Swiler [1], [10], which introduced
the concept of graph-based network vulnerability analysis,
and presented an automated tool for generating attack graphs.
Their tool constructs the attack graph using the forward
exploration method, starting from the initial state (the initial
position of the attacker) to any goal state (target). This
approach, however, is not efficient in terms of complexity,
since it evaluates all existing vulnerabilities, including
those that are not relevant to the goal state; therefore, it is
impractical for applying on large-scale networks.
Model checking for efficient security assessment. Ritchey
and Ammann [11] suggested a simple network security
model (consisting of hosts and their vulnerabilities, network
connectivity, current state of the attacker, and available
exploits), on which they apply a model checking technique
(model checker SMV), in order to evaluate the security of
a system by considering the relationships between different
hosts in a network. Ritchey et al. [12] extended the simple
network security model to represent TCP/IP connectivity.
Within their model, which is called topological vulnerability
analysis, the representation of a host was extended to
include network services and configurations, and the network
connectivity model was extended to support link, transport,
and application layer security. Based on Ritchey’s connectivity
model, Jajodia et al. developed a framework which automates
the vulnerability analysis process by deploying an open-source
version of the Nessus scanner [8] and combining its reports
with a global exploits knowledge base.
Model checking methods are more efficient than generating
an attack graph using forward exploration. However, their
main drawback is that they can only represent one attack
path from source to target, while attack graphs enumerate all
possible attacks.
Model checking for attack graph generation. To address
this limitation, Sheyner et al. [2] introduced the attack graph
toolkit, which utilizes model checking tools for automatically
generating attack graphs, thus improving the efficiency and
completeness of the model compared to previous works.
Jha et al. also suggested to use model checking for attack
graph generation [13]. Similar to [2], the authors modified
the model checker NuSMV in order to produce a complete
attack graph.
However, for the construction of attack graphs, model
checking algorithms doesn’t scale well; for example, in the
work of Sheyner et al. [2] the construction of attack graph
for a network with five hosts and eight exploits took two
hours and resulted in 5948 nodes and 68364 edges. Ammann
et al. suggested to use a layered model to improve the
scalability [14]. They modeled facts (privileges, connectivity,
and vulnerabilities) as generic attributes (e.g., the attacker has
ftp access to a specific host) and exploits as transformations
that map a set of preconditions to a set of postconditions. Then,
they arranged the attributes in layers according to amount of
exploits required to obtain them.
Nevertheless, the main shortcoming of the above studies
is that none of them automatically integrates vulnerability
and network connectivity information into the attack graph
generation process, and therefore none of them can support
the analysis of large-scale networks.
End-to-end attack graph generation frameworks. The
first framework to provide automatic end-to-end attack graph
generation and analysis is MulVAL [6], a logic-based network
security analyzer. MulVAL leverages exiting vulnerability
databases (e.g., the National Vulnerability Database – NVD)
and network vulnerability assessment tools (e.g., Nessus) to
automatically derive the inputs for the attack graph generation
process. This is done by using Datalog as the modeling
language, which makes the integration of vulnerability
databases and security assessment tools straightforward.
Another benefit of Datalog over model checking tools is
its efficiency. The complexity for model checking tools to
enumerate all possible attack paths is exponential in the
size of the network [6]. In contrast, Datalog programs are
polynomial in the size of network.
Following MulVAL, Ingols et al. presented NetSPA, an end-
to-end framework for attack graph generation [4]. NetSPA im-
proves the input generation process by automatically extracting
information from additional data sources such as Check Point
firewalls and the CVE repository [15].
In 2013, Yi et al. [16] compared several academic attack
graph generation tools (TVA, Attack Graph Toolkit, NetSPA,
and MulVAL), as well as commercial software (Cauldron [17],
[18] which is based on TVA, Firemon [19] which is based on
NetSPA, and Skybox [20]) and concluded that: (1) MulVAL
is the most extendable and scalable framework; (2) TVA and
NetSPA are also scalable, however they are not open-source;
and (3) commercial tools are more scalable and provide an
intuitive graphical user interface, however they are not suitable
for research. Therefore, in this study, we focus on the MulVAL
attack graph framework.
B. The MulVAL Framework
MulVAL is a logic-based security analyzer that models the
interactions between software bugs and network configurations
(i.e., connectivity), while automating the information gathering
process by deploying host-based scanners. The modeling
language used by MulVAL is Datalog [6], which is a subset
of the Prolog logic programming language. We demonstrate
MulVAL’s modeling using the simple attack scenario
illustrated in Figure 1: the attacker aims to execute malicious
code in the database server by abusing the free access from
the Internet to the server and the vulnerable database software
that allows privilege escalation (CVE-2012-3132).
Datalog primitives and syntax. The Datalog language
consists of facts and rules, which are defined using
predicates. Predicate is an atomic formula of the form:
p(t1, ..., tk)
where, each ti can be either a constant (starting with a
lower-case) or a variable (starting with an upper-case); wild
cards are also supported and are marked with underscore
(” ”). For example, the following predicate states that: some
vulnerability is present in the oracleDB program running on
dbServer.
vulExists(dbServer, V ulID, oracleDB).
Rules (referred to as interaction rules in MulVAL) are
represented using Horn clauses as follows:
P0 : −P1, ..., Pn
which essentially tells that if the predicates P1, ..., Pn are true,
then predicate P0 is also true. The left part of the clause (P0)
is called the head and the right part (P1, ..., Pn) is called
the body. Facts are clauses with no body. For example, the
following rule tells that a host can be remotely accessed if it
runs a login service using specific port and protocol and it is
accessible via the same protocol and port.
canAccessHost(H) : −
logInService(H,Protocol, Port),
netAccess(H,Protocol, Port)).
The XSB system. In order to execute a Datalog program,
MulVAL uses the XSB environment, which is an extended
implementation of the Prolog programming language that
supports tabled execution. Tabled execution prevents the re-
calculation of previously calculated facts (i.e., each fact is
calculated only once). Since the number of facts is polynomial
in the size of the network, executing a Datalog program has
a polynomial time complexity.
Attacks are simulated according to the attackerGoal(p) facts
(where p is a predicate defined in the Datalog program) that
Fig. 1: MulVAL example: code execution scenario.
are specified in the input to MulVAL (the complete example
input is given in Appendix B). The simulation is performed by
querying the Datalog program for the predicate p; the attack
graph is constructed based on the trace generated by this query.
A detailed description of the Datalog trace analysis and attack
graph construction is provided by Ou et al. in [5].
Attack graph representation. MulVAL generates a logical
attack graph as defined in [5]: AG = (Nr, Np, Nd, E,L,G),
where Nr, Np, Nd are the sets of nodes (derivations, primitive
facts, and derived facts correspondingly), E is the set of edges,
L is a mapping from a node to its label (i.e., the predicate it
represents), and G is the node representing the attacker’s goal.
Figure 2 presents the attack graph generated by the MulVAL
tool1 for the attack scenario described above.
Derivation nodes (visualized as circles) correspond to inter-
action rules and represent the reason for a fact to become
true, they can be viewed as attack steps (Nr = {2, 4}).
Primitive facts (visualized as rectangles) correspond to the
information given as input (Np = {5, 6, 7, 8}), while derived
facts (visualized as diamonds) are the results of applying
interaction rules on the primitive facts (can be viewed as attack
step consequences; i.e., Nd = {1, 3}). An edge e ∈ E can
connect between a primitive or derived fact and a derivation
(e ∈ {(Np ∪ Nd) × Nr}), or between a derivation and a
derived fact (e ∈ {Nr ×Nd}). The derivation nodes imply an
and relation between their incoming nodes, which represent
the preconditions for performing the corresponding actions;
while the derived fact nodes imply an or relation between
their incoming nodes, which represent the various actions that
result in the same consequence.
III. RELATED WORK
The main limitation of MulVAL is that it only considers
software vulnerabilities and does not address vulnerabilities in
the design of network protocols. Previous studies focused on
extending the expressibility of MulVAL’s security model. Ap-
pendix A presents a comparison between MulVAL’s modeling,
previously suggested extensions, and our proposed extensions.
Froh et al. [21], [22] developed two extensions for Mul-
VAL. The first extension includes three main improvements:
a more realistic network model that includes subnets and
1MulVAL tool: http://www.arguslab.org/software/mulval.html
Node Description (L(Node))
1 execCode(dbServer, root)
2 RULE 2: remote exploit of a server pro-
gram
3 netAccess(dbServer, tcp, 1521)
4 RULE 6: direct network access
5 hacl(internet, dbServer, tcp, 1521)
6 attackerLocated(internet)
7 networkServiceInfo(dbServer, oracleDB,
tcp, 1521, root)
8 vulExists(dbServer, ’CVE-2012-
3132’, oracleDB, remoteExploit,
privEscalation)
Fig. 2: MulVAL example: code execution attack graph.
routers; modeling of data authorization policies; and an al-
gorithm for prioritizing attack paths based on their impact
on the organization. The second extension includes modeling
of additional safeguards (e.g., application level authentication)
and a definition of high-level IT services for better attack graph
analysis. Although these extensions produce more realistic
modeling, they are limited to software vulnerabilities and
cannot be used to model vulnerabilities in network protocols
or modern IT networks (such as those that include wireless
communication).
These works, however, focus on the efficiency and post-
assessment of the attack graph and not on extending the
framework to represent additional scenarios.
Acosta et al. [9] extended MulVAL to represent a specific
data link vulnerability through which the ARP spoofing attack
can be modeled. In this study, we propose a comprehensive
network model, which considers the seven layers of the
OSI model, supports wireless and short-range communication
protocols, and models specific industrial communication archi-
tectures. Our proposed modeling enables the representation of
various attacks on the physical, data link, network, and appli-
cation layers. Furthermore, we develop a prototype system that
automatically collects network configurations, converts them
to MulVAL’s input, and generates the attack graph.
IV. NETWORK MODELING
A. Overview
In order to support more realistic network modeling, we
added new predicates and interaction rules to MulVAL’s origi-
nal rule set (presented in [23]). These predicates can be catego-
rized into: physical network topology, network communication,
principal access, host configuration, and vulnerability.
In our extended modeling, IT networks are modeled using
the following three layers: link, end-to-end, and application,
as presented in Figure 3. The link layer integrates the network
topology, users’ actions, protocols, and vulnerabilities that are
associated with a specific network zone (e.g., ARP spoofing in
a subnet or WEP cracking). The end-to-end layer represents
communication between specific hosts and services in remote
hosts (OSI layers 3-7); it models the ability of two hosts to
communicate using various protocols (e.g., FTP, HTTP) and
the vulnerabilities existing in these protocols. The application
layer represents the user data and the data generated as a
result of an end-to-end communication (e.g., the transmission
of an e-mail). To represent the connectivity between hosts
Fig. 3: Illustration of the three-layer network structure and
related predicates.
in each layer, we defined the l2Connection, aclNW , and
dataF low predicates. We also defined predicates that bind the
different layers of communication. The flowBind predicate
associates an end-to-end protocol with a data flow, and the
relay predicate associates a physical host with a data flow
or an end-to-end communication. Since l2Connection and
relay represent physical connections and components, they are
categorized as physical network topology; aclNW , dataF low,
and flowBind are related to end-to-end and application
communications, thus, are categorized as network communi-
cation. It is important to bind between the different layers
because attacks on a lower layer can affect the upper layers
of the communication. For example, transmitting plain-text
data over an encrypted end-to-end protocol can be considered
safe; however, if an attacker succeed to break the end-to-end
encryption he/she can read the transmitted data.
We also model principals’ access to hosts in each layer.
The l2Access and netAccess predicates express a princi-
pal’s access to a host in the link and end-to-end layers,
respectively, while the accessLinkF low, accessE2EFlow
and acessDataF low predicates express the principal’s access
to the corresponding layer’s communication.
Vulnerabilities are classified into host, protocol, and data,
according to their range of impact, and they are represented
by the following predicates: vulHost, vulLinkProtocol,
vulE2EProtocol, and vulData. A detailed description of the
proposed extended network modeling follows.
B. Physical Network Topology
Network Architecture and Components (see Listing 1).
In order to bind an entity (e.g., a user or a host) to a network
zone, MulVAL uses the located predicate (line 1). We find this
coarse definition of zone insufficient for modeling the physical
network topology. Hence, we extend the located predicate to
specify the type (Type) of a network zone (line 2): an IP
subnet to which Host belongs (ipSubnet), a serial bus to
which Host is physically connected (bus), or the physical
location (position) of Host.
To indicate the usage of a specific link layer proto-
col in a zone (e.g., serial Modbus in a bus) we intro-
duce the existingProtocol predicate (line 3). For exam-
ple, existingProtocol(subnet1, arp) indicates that hosts in
subnet1 use ARP.
To be able to model network components (e.g., switch or
router) in the physical network topology, we define the relay
1 located(Principal, Zone).
2 located(Host,Zone,Type).
3 existingProtocol(Zone,Protocol).
4 relay(RelayHost,SrcHost,DstHost).
5 relay(RelayHost,SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,Port).
6 relay(RelayHost,DataFlow).
7 isGateway(Router,Subnet)
8 isAP(AP,WirelessRange,DstZone,Prot,SecurityConf).
9 isNameResolver(ResolverHost,UserHost,Searched).
10 isMaster(Device,BusID).
11 isSlave(Device,BusID).
Listing 1: Network components.
predicates. We distinguish between three types of network
relays: a link layer relay that controls the entire communi-
cation between SrcHost and DstHost (line 4); a network
layer relay that controls the communication of SrcHost and
DstHost on a specific protocol (Prot) and port (Port)
(line 5); and an application layer relay that controls the
communication of a specific application data flow (line 6).
We also define predicates that provide an indication about
specific roles of network components (lines 7-11). The
isGateway predicate indicates that Router is the gateway of
Subnet (line 7). The isAP predicate provides an indication
regarding an access point that broadcasts to a WirelessRange
and is connected to a DstZone (line 8); whereas, the Prot
argument specifies which protocol is used to establish the wire-
less connection (e.g., WEP), and the SecurityConf argument
specifies whether the access point uses a secured protocol
(SecurityConf = secured) or is open to any connection
request (SecurityConf = open). The isNameResolver
predicate indicates that ResolverHost is the name resolver
that is queried by UserHost for finding the IP address
associated with the name denoted by Searched (line 9).
Finally, the isMaster and isSlave predicates are used to
indicate master/slave components that are common in serial
buses. The master device issues commands to others (i.e.,
initiates the communication), and the slave components re-
spond to the master’s commands (lines 10-11). It is important
to distinguish between these two roles, since they affect the
attacker’s capabilities in a serial bus.
Network Connectivity (see Listing 2). Within MulVAL, the
communication between hosts is represented by the hacl pred-
icate, which represents an abstraction of some host’s ability
to reach another after considering the network’s topology and
security configurations [23] (e.g., if there is a firewall denying
the communication between two hosts, an hacl fact will not be
generated). We find this abstraction unsuitable for modeling
the link and physical layers connections. As mentioned, we
distinguish between the link layer connectivity (which is not
addressed by the original MulVAL modeling), and the end-
to-end connectivity (which is originally addressed by the hacl
predicates). A link layer connectivity relates to the connections
between hosts through a shared medium (e.g., Ethernet, Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth, bus, etc.). We represent this type of connectivity
using the l2Connection predicate (line 1), which indicates that
two devices (Dev1 and Dev2) are connected via the same
link (LinkId) of Type and can communicate using protocol
Prot. We consider the following three medium types:
1) Ethernet: an Ethernet link (ipSubnet) enables the connec-
tivity between two devices (Dev1 and Dev2) located in the
1 l2Connection(Dev1,Dev2,LinkId,Prot,Type)
2 l2Connection(Dev1,Dev2,Link,Prot,ipSubnet):-
3 located(Dev1,LinkId,ipSubnet),
4 located(Dev2,LinkId,ipSubnet),
5 existingProtocol(LinkId,Prot).
6 l2Connection(Dev1,Dev2,Prot,bus):-
7 located(Dev1,BusID,bus),
8 located(Dev2,BusID,bus),
9 existingProtocol(BusID,Prot).
10 l2Connection(Dev,AP,WirelessRange,Prot,wireless):-
11 isAP(AP,WirelessRange,DstZone,Prot,open),
12 located(Dev,WirelessRange,physical).
13 l2Connection(Dev,AP,WirelessRange,Prot,wireless):-
14 isAP(AP,WirelessRange,DstZone,Prot,secured),
15 located(Dev,WirelessRange,physical),
16 isAuthenticated(Principal,Dev,AP).
17 located(Dev,DstZone,Type):-
18 l2Connection(Dev,AP,WirelessRange,Prot,wireless),
19 isAP(AP,WirelessRange,DstZone,Prot,secured),
20 located(_,DstZone,Type).
21 l2Connection(MasterDevice,SlaveDevice,BluetoothRange,bluetooth,wireless):-
22 existingProtocol(BluetoothRange,bluetooth),
23 inDiscoveryMode(SlaveDevice),
24 located(MasterDevice,BluetoothRange,physical),
25 located(SlaveDevice,BluetoothRange,physical).
Listing 2: Network connectivity.
same IP subnet (lines 2-5).
2) Bus: a serial link (bus) enables the connectivity between
two devices (Dev1 and Dev2) connected to it (lines 6-9).
3) Wireless: a wireless link (Type = wireless) enables the
connectivity between two devices that are located within the
same wireless range (WirelessRange). We support two
wireless technologies: Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.
Wi-Fi enables the connectivity between a wireless device
(Dev) and an access point (AP ). We distinguish between
an open access point (lines 10-12) and a secured access
point (lines 13-16), in which the principal (Principal) is
authenticated. When a host connects to an access point
it becomes part of the subnet that the access point is
connected to (denoted by DstZone); thus, we define the
located interaction rule (lines 17-20).
Bluetooth enables the direct connection between two de-
vices (MasterDevice and SlaveDevice) using the Blue-
tooth technology (Type = bluetooth). In this type of
connection the two devices must be physically located
within each other’s range (BluetoothRange). In addition,
the SlaveDevice must be in discovery mode (lines 21-25).
C. Network Communication
Application Layer Communication (see Listing 3). In
our proposed modeling, the application layer represents data
exchange between two entities. We model the communica-
tion in this layer using the dataF low predicate (lines 1-2).
This predicate associates an application layer communication
(FlowName) with the two hosts (SrcHost and DstHost)
that generated it (line 1). For bidirectional communication, the
Direction parameter is set to twoWay; otherwise, it should
be set to oneWay. Subsequently, in some cases it is sufficient
to associate only one communication end with FlowName;
thus, we also define a shorter version of the dataF low
predicate (line 2), where Host is either the source or des-
tination of the communication represented by FlowName.
Communication (data) flows are also associated with end-
to-end protocols (e.g., the transmission of an email can be
associated with SMTP). To express this association, we define
the flowBind predicate (line 3).
1 dataFlow(SrcHost,DstHost,FlowName,Direction).
2 dataFlow(Host,FlowName).
3 flowBind(FlowName,Prot,Port).
4 isPairingProcess(FlowName).
5
6 aclNW(SrcHostOrsubnet,DstHostOrsubnet,Prot,Port).
Listing 3: Network communication.
1 localAccess(Principal,Host,User).
2 localAccess(attacker,Host,admin):-
3 attackerLocated(Host).
4 localAccess(Principal,HostB, User):-
5 hasAccount(Principal,HostB,User),
6 networkService(HostB,Prog,Prot,Port,LoginServiceUser),
7 netAccess(Principal,HostA,HostB,Prot,Port),
8 aclH(HostB,LoginServiceUser,HostA,HostB,Prot,Port),
9 isLoginService(Prog).
Listing 4: Principal host access.
Some attack scenarios rely on the attacker’s ability to exploit
a specific type of data flow. For example, in order to execute
a Bluetooth PIN cracking attack, the attacker needs to capture
the packets transmitted during the pairing process. Thus, we
include the definition of specific data flow types. An example
is isPairingProcess (line 4), which indicates that the data
flow (FlowName) is the sequence of packets transmitted
during a Bluetooth pairing process.
Access Control (see Listing 3). MulVAL represents the net-
work access control policy by hacl predicates, which take the
physical topology of the network into account [23]. In our
proposed modeling, we separate between the representation
of physical topology and access control. We represent the
network-based access control rules by the aclNW predicate
(line 6), which indicates that packets of protocol Prot, orig-
inating in host/subnet (SrcHostOrsubnet) and designated
for a specific port (Port) in the host/subnet denoted by
DstHostOrsubnet, are allowed. Host-based access control
modeling will be described in Section IV-E.
D. Principal Access
The human aspect must also be taken into account when
modeling network access. To be consistent with our three-layer
network modeling, we define a principal access predicate for
each layer: host access, network access, and data access.
Host Access (see Listing 4). Refers to the ability of a principal
to login to a host. This type of access is represented by the
localAccess predicate (line 1), which indicates that a principal
(Principal) can access a host (Host) using the user account
denoted by User. A principal access to a host can also be
inferred from the following two scenarios: (1) an attacker who
is located in a host has access to that host (lines 2-3), and (2)
a principal that has local access to a host (HostA) can use
it to gain access via the network to a remote host (HostB)
by using a network login service and a previously obtained
account (lines 4-9).
Network Access (see Listing 5). Similar to the network
topology and communication, we distinguish between the
principal’s direct access to a host through the link layer (e.g.,
access a component via a serial bus) and by using an end-to-
end protocol (e.g., sending an email using SMTP).
Link layer access is represented by the l2Access predicate
(line 1) which indicates that a principal (Principal) can access
DstHost from SrcHost via the medium denoted by LinkID.
1 l2Access(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,LinkID,Type).
2 l2Access(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,LinkID,Type):-
3 localAccess(Principal,SrcHost,User),
4 l2Connection(SrcHost,DstHost,LinkID,Prot,Type).
5
6 netAccess(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,Port).
7 netAccess(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,Port):-
8 localAccess(Principal,SrcHost,SrcUser),
9 aclNW(SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,Port),
10 aclH(SrcHost,SrcUser,SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,Port).
Listing 5: Principal network access.
1 accessFile(Principal,Host,AccessPerm,Path).
2
3 accessDataFlow(Principal,FlowName,AccessPerm).
4 accessDataFlow(Principal,FlowName,view):-
5 l2Connection(HostA,HostB,WirelessRange,Prot,wireless),
6 located(SideHost,WirelessRange,physical),
7 localAccess(Principal,SideHost,admin),
8 dataFlow(HostA,HostB,FlowName,Direction).
9 accessDataFlow(Principal,FlowName,view):-
10 l2Connection(HostA,RelayHost,WirelessRange,Prot,wireless),
11 located(SideHost,WirelessRange,physical),
12 localAccess(Principal,SideHost,admin),
13 dataFlow(HostA,FlowName),
14 relay(RelayHost,FlowName).
15
16 accessLinkFlow(Principal, SrcHost, DstHost, Prot, AccessPerm)).
17 accessE2EFlow(Principal, SrcHost, DstHost, Prot, Port, AccessPerm)).
Listing 6: Principal data access.
The Type argument refers to the type of medium (similar to
the l2Connection predicate), and the Prot argument specifies
the protocol used in that medium (e.g., Modbus, WEP). The
ability of a principle to access a host via a shared commu-
nication medium is inferred by the interaction rule in lines
2-4: a principal (Principal) with local access to SrcHost
can access DstHost, assuming that they are both connected
to a shared medium LinkID.
In the end-to-end layer, the ability of a principal to access
hosts is represented by the netAccess predicate (line 6), which
indicates that Principal can use SrcHost to communicate
with DstHost on a specific port (Port) using the protocol
Prot. This fact is inferred by the interaction rule in lines
7-10: a principal (Principal) with local access to SrcHost
can communicate with DstHost on Port using the protocol
Prot if this communication is enabled by the network access
control mechanisms (represented by aclNW ) as well as the
DstHost’s access control mechanisms (represented by aclH).
Data Access (see Listing 6). We distinguish between two types
of data: data at rest and data in motion. Access to data at
rest is modeled in MulVAL by the accessF ile predicate (line
1), which indicates that Principal can access files in Path
present in Host with AccessPerm permissions (read, write,
or execute). We extend MulVAL to model access to data in
motion as well by defining the accessDataF low predicate
(line 3), which indicates that Principal has access to the data
flow denoted by FlowName. There are three possible access
types: (1) view - the principal is able to view FlowName
but not necessarily read its content, (2) read - the principal
can read the content of FlowName, i.e., see it in plain
text, and (3) write - the principal can manipulate the data in
FlowName. These access types can contain each other: if a
principal can read a data flow, he/she can also view it; and if
a principal can write to a data flow, he/she can also read it.
The interaction rules in lines 4-8 and 9-14 describe the
ability to view wireless traffic. Lines 4-8 describe a sce-
nario in which a principal’s host (SideHost) is located in
the wireless range (WirelessRange) of the communication
between HostA and HostB. Based on the assumption that
SideHost is equipped with a network interface, Principal
can capture the wireless traffic in that range. Similarly, lines
9-14, describe a scenario in which the SideHost is positioned
in the broadcast range of a device (e.g., access point) that
is a relay to the communication that the principal wishes to
capture.
To be consistent with the three-layer network model, we
also defined accessLinkFlow and accessE2EFlow predicates
(lines 16-17) in order to represent a principal’s access to the
communication in these layers. We also included interaction
rules to bind protocol vulnerabilities with the data access level
they permit across the network layers. These definitions are
important, since actual attacks tend to be executed in this
step-by-step manner, thus they make our model realistic and
practical.
Figure 4 presents an example of this. In the first step
(denoted by 1©), an attacker who can access the link layer
(e.g., by connecting his/her laptop to a layer two switch)
can try to exploit link layer vulnerabilities (specified by the
vulLinkProtocol predicate). If the attacker succeeds, he/she
will be able to view the end-to-end layer flow (represented by
accessE2EFlow with the view access type). In the next step
(denoted by 2©), the attacker can try to exploit an end-to-end
protocol vulnerability (represented by the vulE2EProtocol
predicate). If the attacker succeeds, he/she can read the end-to-
end layer flow (represented by accessE2EFlow with the read
access type), which means that the attacker can view the data
flow (represented by accessDataF low with the view access
type). In the final step (denoted by 3©), the attacker can try to
read the data flow (represented by accessDataF low with the
read access type) by attempting to exploit data vulnerabilities
(represented by the vulData predicate).
Fig. 4: Inference structure of accessDataFlow with read access
type
E. Host Configuration
To represent host-based attacks we need to be able to
indicate the characteristics of programs (e.g., login service),
data (e.g., credentials), and access control configuration that
are present on the host. All of the predicates related to host
configuration are presented in Listing 7.
Data. Some attack scenarios rely on the attacker’s ability
to access sensitive content. Therefore, we introduce specific
predicates to represent special data types. The isCredential
predicate indicates that the data denoted by DataName is the
1 isCredential(DataName,Host,User).
2 isNameResolverRecord(DataName).
3 dataBind(DataName,Host,Path).
4
5 networkService(Host,Prog,Prot,Port,User).
6 isLoginService(Prog).
7 localService(Host,Prog,User).
8 dependsOn(Host,Prog,Library).
9 bugHype(Host,Prog,Range,Consequence).
10
11 aclH(Host,User,SrcHostOrSubnet,DstHostOrSubnet,Prot,Port).
Listing 7: Host configuration.
credentials of User on Host (line 1). This predicate can also
be used to indicate that a data flow contains credentials (e.g.,
in the case of remote login).
Another sensitive data type relates to name resolvers
(e.g., DNS servers), i.e., the binding between a nam-
ing and an IP address. This data is represented by the
isNameResolverRecord predicate (line 2), which is used
in the modeling of the DNS spoofing attack (see subsection
V-A).
In addition, we provide the dataBind predicate (line 3) to
associate data (DataName) with a specific path (Path) in a
host (Host).
Program. MulVAL defines two types of programs: network
services and login services. A network service is a program
running under some user permissions on the host while listen-
ing on a specific port and communicates with other instances
using a specific protocol (line 5). A login service is a program
that provides a user the ability to access the host (line 6).
We introduce a third type of program, local service, which
represents any program running on a host, regardless of its
ability to communicate over the network (line 7). This way
we can model multistep attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in
”offline” services (e.g., exploit a vulnerable PDF reader by
providing it with a malformed file).
In addition, we include the dependsOn (line 8) and
bugHype (line 9) predicates. The dependsOn predicate in-
dicates that a program (denoted by Prog) running on Host,
depends on some library (denoted by Library). This predicate
is important for representing vulnerabilities that come from
third party libraries or programs.
The bugHype predicate indicates that a software bug is
present in the program (denoted by Prog) running on a
host (denoted by Host). The meaning of the Range and
Consequence arguments is similar to those specified in the
vulnerability predicates, and are explained in the following
Section.
Access Control. The host-based access control rules are repre-
sented by the aclH predicate (line 11), which indicates that the
local access control mechanism on Host allows User to com-
municate from the host/subnet denoted by SrcHostOrsubnet
with the host/subnet denoted by DstHostOrsubnet on Port
using the protocol Prot.
F. Vulnerability
Vulnerabilities are modeled in MulVAL using the
vulExists and vulProperty predicates [23]. These predi-
cates, however, do not provide a clear distinction between
different types of vulnerabilities; thus, we define three vul-
1 vulHost(Host,VulID,Prog,Range,Consequence).
2 vulHost(Host,VulID,Prog,Range,Consequence):-
3 bugHype(Host,Prog,Range,Consequence).
4 vulHost(Host,VulID,Prog,Range,Consequence):-
5 vulHost(Host,VulID,Library,Range,Consequence),
6 dependsOn(Host,Prog,Library).
Listing 8: Host vulnerability.
1 vulLinkProtocol(LinkID,VulID,Protocol,Range,Consequence).
2 vulLinkProtocol(SrcHost,DstHost,VulID,Protocol,Range,Consequence).
3 vulLinkProtocol(SrcHost,DstHost,VulID,Protocol,Range,Consequence):-
4 vulLinkProtocol(LinkID,VulID,Protocol,Range,Consequence),
5 located(SrcHost,LinkID,Type),
6 located(DstHost,LinkID,Type).
7
8 vulE2EProtocol(Host,VulID,Protocol,Port,Range,Consequence).
9 vulE2EProtocol(SrcHost,DstHost,VulID,Protocol,Port,Range,Consequence).
Listing 9: Network vulnerability.
nerability predicates according to the assets they affect: host,
network, and data.
Host (see Listing 8). A host vulnerability (e.g., a vulnerability
in a software running on the host) is represented by the
vulHost predicate (line 1) defining a specific vulnerability
(V ulID) in a program (Prog) that exists in Host. The Range
argument refers to the context in which the vulnerability can
be exploited and can be set to localExploit, adjacent, or
remoteExploit - similar to the attack vector (AV) metric
of CVSS.2 We also include interaction rules that represent a
host vulnerability due to an implementation bug (lines 2-3) or
dependency in a vulnerable library (lines 4-6), similar to their
basic definition in MulVAL [23].
Network (see Listing 9). A network vulnerability (i.e., a
vulnerability in a communication protocol) is represented by
the vulLinkProtocol (lines 1-2) and vulE2EProtocol (lines
9-10) predicates. The vulLinkProtocol predicate in line 1
defines a vulnerability in a link layer protocol denoted by
Protocol (e.g., ARP, Bluetooth, WEP) that is used in some
communication medium (LinkID) and contains the vulner-
ability V ulID that can be exploited via Range, and results
in Consequence (e.g., eavesdropping, data falsification). The
predicate in line 2 has a similar meaning, except that it
provides an indication of a directed communication between
two specific hosts (SrcHost and DstHost).
We also define the vulLinkProtocol interaction rule in lines
3-7, which infers a vulnerable link layer communication
between SrcHost and DstHost from the fact that they are
connected to the same communication medium (LinkID), in
which a vulnerable link layer protocol (Protocol) is used.
Note that this interaction rule only holds for ipSubnet or bus
medium types.
The vulE2EProtocol predicate represents the use of an end-
to-end protocol denoted by Protocol (e.g., HTTP, SMTP) in
the communication between two hosts on port Port which
contains the vulnerability V ulID that can be exploited via
Range and results in Consequence. The predicate in line
9 indicates that Host is either the source or destination of
the vulnerable communication, and the predicate in line 10
represents a directed vulnerable communication.
Data (see Listing 10). Representing vulnerable data (e.g.,
unencrypted/unsigned communication between two hosts or
2https://www.first.org/cvss/
unencrypted files on a host) is important to avoid detection
of false attack paths. For example, an encrypted sensitive
document will be protected from an eavesdropping attacker
even if it is being exchanged between two hosts over FTP. We
distinguish between vulnerable data at rest (e.g., a file stored
on a host) and vulnerable data in motion (e.g., network traffic
exchanged between two hosts).
Vulnerable data at rest is represented by the vulData pred-
icate (line 1), where Data (e.g., a file) has the vulnerability
V ulID (e.g., unsigned) which can result in Consequence
(e.g., data falsification). We also provide the ability to associate
a vulnerability with a specific range in some host’s memory
by defining the vulBind predicate (line 2). This predicate
indicates that upon successful exploitation of V ulID, all of
the data stored in Path in Host will be affected (e.g., read
by the attacker).
Vulnerable data in motion (i.e., a data flow) is represented
by the vulF low predicate (line 4), which indicates that
FlowName contains a vulnerability denoted by V ulID (e.g.,
unencrypted) that enables Consequence (e.g., eavesdropping).
Since data flows are related to the communication between
two hosts via the network, we infer their vulnerabilities
from communication protocol vulnerabilities. We consider two
vulnerability types: lack of encryption and lack of a signature.
The interaction rule in lines 5-10 describes a scenario of
an insecure data flow between SrcHost and DstHost (rep-
resented by the dataF low and flowBind predicates) that
is exchanged using an insecure end-to-end protocol and an
insecure link protocol (represented by the vulE2EProtocol
and vulLinkProtocol predicates), while the payload itself
(e.g., a file) is not encrypted (represented by the vulData
predicate).
Similarly, in lines 11-17 the flow is only vulnerable within
a specific zone. This situation can occur when: (1) the flow
is transmitted via a relay host (e.g., a router or proxy) that is
connected to the same zone as SrcHost, in which a vulnerable
link protocol that enables eavesdropping is used (represented
by the vulLinkProtocol predicate); (2) the flow is transmitted
using a vulnerable end-to-end protocol that can be exploited
from the relay host and enable eavesdropping (represented by
the vulE2EProtocol predicate). The symmetric case (where
the vulnerability exists in the zone of DstHost) can be defined
in the same manner.
The interaction rule in lines 18-22 describes the scenario of
eavesdropping on an unencrypted link (e.g., bus). In order
for data to be vulnerable to link eavesdropping, it should
be unencrypted (represented by the dataF low and vulData
predicates) and it should also be transmitted via a vulnera-
ble link protocol (represented by the vulLinkProtocol and
flowBind predicates).
The interaction rule in lines 23-27 describes a scenario in
which unsigned data (represented by the dataF low and
vulData predicates) is transmitted via a vulnerable end-to-
end protocol that enables data falsification (represented by the
vulE2EProtocol and flowBind predicates).
1 vulData(Data,VulID,Consequence).
2 vulBind(Host,VulID,Path).
3
4 vulFlow(FlowName,VulID,Consequence).
5 vulFlow(FlowName,unencrypted,Consequence):-
6 dataflow(SrcHost,DstHost,FlowName),
7 flowBind(FlowName,E2EProtocol,E2EPort),
8 vulE2EProtocol(SrcHost,DstHost,VulID1,E2EProtocol,E2EPort,E2ERange,
eavesdropping),
9 vulLinkProtocol(SrcHost,DstHost,VulID2,LinkProtocol,LinkRange,eavesdropping
),
10 vulData(FlowName,unencrypted,Consequence).
11 vulFlow(FlowName,unencrypted,Consequence):-
12 vulE2EProtocol(SrcHost,DstHost,VulID1,E2EProtocol,E2EPort,relayingHost,
eavesdropping),
13 vulLinkProtocol(SrcHost,RelayHost,VulID2,LinkProtocol,LinkRange,
eavesdropping),
14 relay(RelayHost,FlowName),
15 vulData(FlowName,unencrypted,Consequence),
16 dataflow(SrcHost,DstHost,FlowName),
17 flowBind(FlowName,E2EProtocol,E2EPort).
18 vulFlow(FlowName,unencrypted,Consequence):-
19 vulLinkProtocol(SrcHost,DstHost,VulID,Protocol,Range,eavesdropping),
20 vulData(FlowName,unencrypted,Consequence),
21 dataflow(SrcHost,DstHost,FlowName),
22 flowBind(FlowName,Protocol,_).
23 vulFlow(FlowName,unsigned,dataFalsification):-
24 vulE2EProtocol(SrcHost,DstHost,VulID,Protocol,Port,reayingHost,
dataFalsification),
25 vulData(FlowName,unsigned,dataFalsification),
26 dataflow(SrcHost,DstHost,FlowName),
27 flowBind(FlowName,Protocol,Port).
Listing 10: Data vulnerability.
V. ATTACK MODELING
In this section, we demonstrate how the proposed network
modeling can be used to model network attacks, including:
spoofing attacks, denial of service attacks (DoS), man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks, attacks on wireless communication,
and attacks on bus network architecture.
A. Spoofing Attacks
We distinguish between two types of spoofing attacks:
spoofing in the link layer, in which the attacker can spoof the
entire communication between the two hosts, and spoofing
in the end-to-end layer, in which the attacker can spoof a
specific service. These two scenarios are represented using
two predicates: spoofLinkHost (Listing 11, line 1) and
spoofE2EHost (Listing 12, line 1), which specify that a prin-
cipal (Principal) can impersonate ImpersonatedHost and
fool FooledHost using the SpoofingHost by utilizing a vul-
nerability in a link/end-to-end protocol. The Consequence ar-
gument provides an indication about the outcome of the spoof-
ing attack: (1) the traffic is routed via SpoofingHost, e.g., in
an ARP spoofing scenario (Consequence = trafficTheft);
(2) Principal can only deceive FooledHost, e.g., in bus
spoofing scenarios (Consequence = deception). We modeled
the ARP and DNS spoofing attacks using these two predicates.
ARP Spoofing (see Listing 11). ARP spoofing is a technique
by which an attacker can route the traffic intended for some
host to the attacker’s machine. The attacker achieves this by
sending fake ARP messages to a local area network (LAN)
in order to associate the attacker’s MAC address with the
IP address of the victim’s host. In order to perform an ARP
spoofing attack, two preconditions must be satisfied: (1) the
impersonated host must use the vulnerable ARP protocol; and
(2) the attacker must be able to access the impersonated host
via the link layer.
In our modeling we consider two ARP spoofing scenarios:
a scenario in which the impersonated and fooled hosts reside
in the same subnet (lines 3-5), and a scenario in which they
1 spoofLinkHost(Principal,ImpersonatedHost,FooledHost,SpoofingHost,Consequence).
2
3 spoofLinkHost(Principal,ImpersonatedHost,FooledHost,AttackerHost, trafficTheft
):-
4 vulLinkProtocol(FooledHost,ImpersonatedHost,VulID,Prot,adjacent,
impersonateDst),
5 l2Access(Principal,AttackerHost,ImpersonatedHost,Prot,Zone,ipSubnet).
6 spoofLinkHost(Principal,ImpersonatedHost,FooledHost,AttackerHost,trafficTheft)
:-
7 vulLinkProtocol(RelayHost,ImpersonatedHost,VulID,Prot,adjacent,
impersonateDst),
8 l2Access(Principal,AttackerHost,ImpersonatedHost,Prot,Subnet,ipSubnet),
9 dataFlow(FooledHost,ImpersonatedHost,FlowName),
10 isGateway(RelayHost,Subnet).
Listing 11: ARP spoofing.
reside in different subnets (lines 6-10). The two preconditions
for performing this attack are represented in both scenarios by
the vulLinkProtocol and l2Access predicates.
DNS Spoofing (see Listing 12). In our modeling, we consider
three DNS spoofing scenarios: (1) a scenario in which the
attacker spoofs as the name server and provides malicious
binding for legitimate requests, (2) a scenario in which the
attacker provides a fake response by utilizing a race condition
(i.e., answers faster than the legitimate server), and (3) a
scenario in which the attacker changes DNS records in the
name server/host cache.
The first DNS spoofing scenario can be represented di-
rectly by the spoofE2EHost interaction rules that result in
trafficTheft, in which the argument ImpersonatedHost
matches the identifier of the DNS server.
The second DNS spoofing scenario is more complicated,
since the attacker utilizes the response time of a higher DNS
resolver in order to send a fake response to the querying
DNS server, binding the attacker’s host’s IP address to the
queried naming. Hence, in order to execute this attack, the
DNS server should communicate using a vulnerable version
of the DNS protocol. As can be seen in lines 3-6, this prereq-
uisite is represented by the isNameResolver and netAccess
predicates. Following the successful execution of this attack,
the querying host (FooledHost) will initiate communication
with the attacker’s host (which can be AttackerHost or any
other host) instead of the real host.
The third DNS spoofing scenario can be executed by gaining
access to the DNS server with admin privileges. We modeled
this scenario in lines 7-11; as can be seen, the attacker
(Principal) can log in using local access (localAccess pred-
icates) to the DNS server and modify the DNS records to
associate the attacker’s host with a naming of his/hers choice.
The success of the attack depends on the ability of the
fooled host to access the attacker’s host through the network
(expressed by the netAccess predicate). Alternatively, this
scenario can be executed by gaining write access permission
to some path in the DNS server, which happens to contain a
DNS record. We modeled this scenario in lines 12-16.
B. Denial of Service Attacks
We extend MulVAL’s dos predicate in order to indicate who
is performing the attack (see Listing 13, line 1) as well as
to support host-based (lines 3-7) and network-based (lines
8-13) DoS attacks. In a host-based DoS attack, the attacker
Principal (represented by the malicious predicate) exploits
his/her login access to Host (represented by the localAccess
1 spoofE2EHost(Principal,ImpersonatedHost,FooledHost,SpoofingHost,Prot,Port,
Consequence).
2
3 spoofE2EHost(Principal, ImpersonatedHost, FooledHost, AttackerHost, Prot, Port
, trafficTheft):-
4 isNameResolver(NameResolver, FooledHost, ImpersonatedHost),
5 vulE2EProtocol(FooledHost, NameResolver, dnsCachePoisoning, dns, DNSPort,
remoteExploit, dataFalsification),
6 netAccess(Principal, AttackerHost, NameResolver, dns, DNSPort).
7 spoofE2EHost(Principal, ImpersonatedHost, FooledHost, AttackerHost, Prot, Port
, trafficTheft):-
8 isNameResolver(NameResolver, FooledHost, ImpersonatedHost),
9 localAccess(Principal, NameResolver, admin),
10 netAccess(Principal2, FooledHost, AttackerHost, Prot, Port),
11 localAccess(Principal, AttackerHost, User).
12 spoofE2EHost(Principal, ImpersonatedHost, FooledHost, AttackerHost, Prot, Port
, trafficTheft):-
13 isNameResolver(NameResolver, FooledHost, ImpersonatedHost),
14 accessFile(Principal, NameResolver, write, RecoredPath),
15 dataBind(NameResolverRecord, NameResolver, RecoredPath),
16 isNameResolverRecord(NameResolverRecord).
Listing 12: DNS spoofing.
1 dos(Principal,Host).
2
3 dos(Principal,Host):-
4 localAccess(Principal,Host,User),
5 localService(Host,Prog,User),
6 vulHost(Host,VulID,Prog,localExploit,dos),
7 malicious(Principal).
8 dos(Principal,DstHost):-
9 networkService(DstHost,Prog,Prot,Port,NetworkServiceUser),
10 aclH(DstHost,NetworkServiceUser,SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,Port),
11 vulHost(DstHost,VulID,Prog,remoteExploit,dos),
12 netAccess(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,Port),
13 malicious(Principal).
Listing 13: DoS attacks.
predicate) which runs a vulnerable service that allows DoS
(represented by the localService and vulHost predicates). In
a network-based DoS attack, the attacker Principal exploits
his/her access to a network service running on DstHost
(represented by the netAccess, aclH, and networkService pred-
icates), which contains a vulnerability that enables DoS upon
successful exploitation (represented by the vulHost predi-
cate).
C. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a scenario in which
the attacker manages to pose as a relay of the communication
between two hosts. We distinguish between a MITM attack
in the link layer (Listing 14, lines 1-6), in which the entire
communication between SrcHost and DstHost is routed
through the attacker’s host (AttackerHost); and a MITM
attack in the end-to-end layer (Listing 14, lines 8-12), in which
only a specific application layer protocol (represented by the
Port and Prot arguments) is routed through the attacker’s
host.
D. Attacks on Wireless Communication
One of the main contributions of this work is the ability
to model attacks on wireless communication. Specifically,
we model two common attacks on wireless protocols: WEP
cracking and Bluetooth PIN cracking, both of which enable
the attacker to derive the encryption key used for the secured
communication.
WEP Cracking (see Listing 15). The Wired Equivalent Pri-
vacy (WEP) algorithm is based on the RC4 stream cipher
which has weak key scheduling and uses a small initial vector
(IV) of 24 bits [24]. In order to crack WEP’s encryption, the
following two preconditions must be satisfied: (1) the attacker
must capture a large amount of legitimate packets transmitted
to/from the access point; and (2) the access point must use the
1 mitmLink(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,SpoofingHost):-
2 spoofLinkHost(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,SpoofingHost,trafficTheft),
3 spoofLinkHost(Principal,DstHost,SrcHost,SpoofingHost,trafficTheft).
4 relay(MITMHost,FlowName):-
5 mitmLink(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,MITMHost),
6 dataFlow(SrcHost,DstHost,FlowName,Direction).
7
8 mitmE2E(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,SpoofingHost,Prot,Port):-
9 spoofE2EHost(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,SpoofingHost,Prot,Port,trafficTheft)
,
10 spoofE2EHost(Principal,DstHost,SrcHost,SpoofingHost,Prot,Port,trafficTheft)
.
11 relay(MITMHost,SrcHost,DstHost,Prot,Port):-
12 mitmE2E(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,MITMHost,Prot,Port).
Listing 14: MiTM attacks.
1 crackAPEncKey(Principal,AP):-
2 malicious(Principal),
3 accessDataFlow(Principal,FlowName,view),
4 relay(AP,FlowName),
5 isAP(AP,WirelessRange,DstZone,Prot,secured),
6 vulLinkProtocol(WirelessRange,weakEncryption,Prot,remoteExploit,
keyExtraction).
7
8 accessDataFlow(Principal,FlowName,read):-
9 crackAPEncKey(Principal,AP),
10 relay(AP,FlowName),
11 dataFlow(Host,FlowName),
12 flowBind(FlowName,Prot,Port),
13 vulE2EProtocol(Host,VulID,Prot,Port,remoteExploit,eavesdropping),
14 isAP(AP,WirelessRange,DstZone,WirelessProt,secured),
15 located(AttackerHost,WirelessRange,physical),
16 localAccess(Principal,AttackerHost,admin).
17
18 isAuthenticated(Principal,AttackerHost,AP):-
19 crackAPEncKey(Principal,AP),
20 isAP(AP,WirelessRange,DstZone,Prot,secured),
21 localAccess(Principal,AttackerHost,admin),
22 located(AttackerHost,WirelessRange,physical).
Listing 15: WEP cracking attack.
vulnerable WEP protocol. Afterwards the attacker can crack
the encryption key by performing offline analysis [24]. These
two preconditions are modeled by the crackAPEncKey in-
teraction rule (lines 1-6), which utilizes the accessDataF low,
relay, isAP , and vulLinkProtocol predicates.
By cracking the encryption key, the attacker can (1)
eavesdrop on all of the traffic broadcasted by the com-
promised access point; and (2) authenticate to the access
point. These two different consequences are represented by
the accessDataF low and isAuthenticated interaction rules
(lines 8-22).
WPA2 Key Reinstallation. (see Listing 16). The Wi-fi Pro-
tected Access II (WPA2) protocol is widely used for protecting
wireless networks. The Key Reinstallation Attack on the
WPA2 protocol, which exploits a vulnerability in the 4-way
handshake and tricks the victim into reinstalling an already
in-used key, was published in 2017 by Vanhoef and Piessens
[25]. The 4-way handshake is used for assuring that both client
and access point has the correct credentials, and to negotiate
an encryption key for encrypting future communication. The
encryption key is installed in the client after receiving the
3rd handshake message. If no acknowledgment is received
(i.e., the 4th handshake message), the access point might
retransmit the 3rd handshake message to handle messages loss.
Upon receiving this message, the client reinstalls the same
encryption key and resets the nonce, which is also used in
the derivation of the encryption key. As a result, an already
used encryption key with a previously used nonce is used
to further encrypt packets. Then, the attacker can derive the
WPA2’s encryption protocols keystream by using an encrypted
message with a known content (or other methods when no such
messages are found). In short, the key reinstallation attack
is performed by the following two steps: (1) The attacker
1 accessLinkFlow(Principal, Host, AP, Protocol, read):-
2 malicious(Principal),
3 localAccess(Principal, AttackerHost, admin),
4 located(AttackerHost, WirelessRange, physical),
5 flowBind(Flowname, Protocol, Port),
6 isCredential(Flowname, DstZone, User),
7 vulLinkProtocol(WirelessRange, VulID, Protocol, adjacent, keyReinstallation
),
8 isAP(AP, WirelessRange, DstZone, Protocol, secured),
9 located(Host, WirelessRange, physical).
10 crackAPEncKey3(Principal, Host, AP):-
11 malicious1(Principal),
12 accessLinkFlow5(Principal, Host, AP, Protocol, read),
13 isAP5(AP, WirelessRange, DstZone, Protocol, secured),
14 vulLinkProtocol5(WirelessRange, VulID1, Protocol, adjacent,
keyReinstallation),
15 vulHost5(Host, VulID2, wpaSupplicant, localExploit, keyExtraction).
Listing 16: WPA2 key reinstallation attack.
becomes a MITM between the host and the access point (e.g.,
by channel-based MITM technique [26]); and (2) the attacker
prevents the 4th handshake message from reaching the access
point, which causes the retransmission of the 3rd message.
This scenario is represented by the interaction rule in
lines 1-9. Lines 1-4 and 9 describe that the attacker’s host
(AttackerHost) and the victim’s host (Host) are located in
the same zone, so that the attacker is able to perform the first
step of the attack (MITM). The flowBind predicate in line 5
suggests that a data flow is transmitted using a specific proto-
col; in addition, the isCredential predicate in line 6 provides
indication that this data flow is part of the protocol’s handshake
(which the attacker plans to interrupt). Lines 7-8 describe that
the access point that defined the zone (WirelessRange), in
which both the attacker’s host and victim’s host are locates,
uses a vulnerable communication protocol version that allows
the execution of the key reinstallation attack. Thus, enabling
the attacker to decipher future communication between the
victim’s host and the access point.
Furthermore, the authors in [25] found an additional vul-
nerability in several WPA2 implementations that reinstall an
all-zero encryption key upon retransmission of 3rd handshake
message. The corresponding interaction rule is presented in
lines 10-15. This rule uniquely described this version of the
key reinstallation attack by requiring that the communication
protocol will be vulnerable to key reinstallation attack and that
the victim’s host (Host) will run a vulnerable version of the
process (wpa supplicant) that enables for reinstalling the all-
zero key. The accessLinkF low in line 12 implies that the
attacker (Principal) managed to crack the encryption of the
communication protocol (Protocol) that is used to communi-
cate with the access point; together with the requirement vul-
nerability requirement in line 14, the accessLinkF low pred-
icate should represent the successful exploitation of the key
reinstallation attack (i.e., the rule in lines 1-9 is derived). Note
that since the attacker knows the actual key after performing
this attack (sequence of zeros), this scenario is represented by a
CrackAPEncKey rather than an acessLinkF low predicate.
Bluetooth PIN Cracking (see Listing 17). In 2005, Shaked
et al. [27] presented a method for cracking the shared secret
(referred to as PIN code) of two devices establishing a
Bluetooth communication (using offline analysis). In order to
execute the attack, the attacker must eavesdrop on the entire
pairing process between the two devices. This precondition
1 crackPINCode(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost):-
2 malicious(Principal),
3 accessDataFlow(Principal,FlowName,read),
4 dataFlow(SrcHost,DstHost,FlowName,Direction),
5 flowBind(FlowName,bluetooth,_),
6 isPairingProcess(FlowName).
7
8 accessDataFlow(Principal,FlowName,read):-
9 crackPINCode(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost),
10 dataFlow(SrcHost,DstHost,FlowName,Direction),
11 flowBind(FlowName,bluetooth,_),
12 located(AttackerHost,BluetoothRange,physical),
13 localAccess(Principal,AttackerHost,admin).
Listing 17: PIN cracking attack.
is represented by the crackPINCode interaction rule (lines
1-6). As can be seen, the attacker Principal (represented by
the malicious predicate) can read the messages exchanged by
two devices (represented by the accessDataF low, dataF low,
and flowBind predicates) during their pairing process (repre-
sented by the isPairingProcess predicate). After capturing
the messages, the attacker can perform the offline analysis
presented in [27]. The consequence of this attack is that the
attacker acquires the capability to decipher the communication
between SrcHost and DstHost; we represent this capability
using the accessDataFlow interaction rule (lines 8-13).
E. Attacks on Bus Communication
Another major contribution of our work is the definition
of serial bus topology, which can be found in critical infras-
tructure. In this section, we describe how DoS and spoofing
attacks can be applied to bus architecture and how they can
be modeled using our suggested network modeling.
Denial of Service. In bus topology, all of the devices are
physically connected to the same physical medium in order to
communicate. A DoS attack on a serial bus can be executed
in several ways, e.g., a compromised device can continually
broadcast data and cause collisions on the bus, or a compro-
mised device can broadcast data when detecting a data transfer
to/from a specific device in order to prevent it from requesting
service or transmitting data (i.e., DoS for a specific device).
Therefore, just one of the devices connected to a bus needs to
be compromised in order to cause a DoS for all of the other
connected devices.
To represent these scenarios, we define the dos interaction
rule (Listing 18, lines 1-3), which reflects the fact that the
attacker Principal (represented by the malicious predicate)
can utilize his/her local access (i.e., login or ability to execute
code) to a device connected to a bus in order to deny service
to any other device connected to that bus (represented by the
l2Access predicate).
Master/Slave Spoofing. Spoofing attacks on serial protocols
are largely feasible due to the lack of authentication (e.g.,
serial Modbus used in OT systems). In our current modeling,
we only consider master/slave buses. We distinguish between
two spoofing scenarios: (1) a compromised device connected
to the bus masquerades as the master and sends fake data
and commands, and (2) a compromised device connected to
the bus masquerades as a slave and sends false data. We
distinguish between these two cases, since the abilities of
the attacker can be affected by the role of the compromised
component (i.e., a master or slave). Since we represent serial
1 dos(Principal,DstHost):-
2 malicious(Principal),
3 l2Access(Principal,SrcHost,DstHost,Port,BusID,bus).
4
5 spoofLinkHost(Principal,ImpersonatedHost,FooledHost,AttackerHost,deception):-
6 vulLinkProtocol(ImpersonatedHost,FooledHost,VulID,Prot,adjacent,
impersonateSrc),
7 l2Connection(AttackerHost,FooledHost,BusID,Prot,bus),
8 localAccess(Principal,AttackerHost,User),
9 isMaster(ImpersonatedHost,BusID).
10 spoofLinkHost(Principal,ImpersonatedHost,FooledHost,AttackerHost,deception):-
11 vulLinkProtocol(ImpersonatedHost,FooledHost,VulID,Prot,adjacent,
impersonatedSrc),
12 l2Connection(AttackerHost,FooledHost,BusID,Prot,bus),
13 localAccess(Principal,AttackerHost,User),
14 isSlave(ImpersonatedHost,BusID).
Listing 18: Attacks on serial bus.
bus communication, the bus spoofing attack scenarios are
represented as spoofLinkHost interaction rules.
The master spoofing scenario is represented by the interac-
tion rule in Listing 18, lines 5-9. In this scenario, the attacker
Principal can log in to the AttackerHost (represented by
the localAccess predicate) which is connected to the same bus
as FooledHost (represented by the l2Connection predicate).
By exploiting a vulnerability in the communication protocol
used by ImpersonatesHost and FooledHost (represented
by the vulLinkProtocol predicate), Principal is able to
impersonate as ImpersonatesHost, which is the master in
the bus (isMaster).
The slave spoofing scenario is represented by the interaction
rule in Listing 18, lines 10-14, which is similar to the master
spoofing scenario, except for the fact that ImpersonatesHost
is a slave in the bus (represented by the isSlave predicate)
and not the master.
VI. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTOMATIC FACT
GENERATION PROCESS
The main advantage of MulVAL over other attack graph
solutions is that it provides an end-to-end framework for
attack graph generation. In order to preserve this strength,
we developed a prototype system which automatically collects
relevant information from the target system and generates the
facts about the system with respect to the new network model-
ing (presented in Section IV). This prototype implements the
following four fact generation methods:
Scan: facts that are generated directly from scan results; i.e.,
there is a complete mapping between the predicate’s arguments
and data in the scan results. A summary of the various tools
that are used by the prototype system is presented in Table
I. It should be noted that the current version of the prototype
implementation supports the scanning of IP networks only.
Knowledge: facts that are generated using a knowledge base.
The knowledge base contains general and system specific
information, such as program characteristics, system config-
uration, etc.
Assumption: facts that are generated with default values (e.g.,
unknown or a wildcard).
Manual: facts that are generated manually, based on in-
formation provided by the operator/security expert, such as
attackerLocated, attackGoal and malicious(attacker).
A complete mapping of the four methods to predicates is
presented in Appendix C.
Fig. 5: Testbed network topology
VII. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the application of our proposed mod-
eling in a real environment, we established an operational
testbed simulating a simple thermal power plant process (see
Figure 5).
The testbed consists of: five generators, a boiler, a control
panel, three programmable logic controllers (PLCs), an engi-
neering work station (EWS), a historian, a human machine
interface (HMI), a Windows workstation, a Windows server,
a DNS server, an access point, and a laptop. There are two
subnets: IT Network (the enterprise environment) and OT Net-
work (the OT environment) which are connected by a firewall.
IT Network is also connected to the Internet. Bluetooth Zone
defines the range in which PLC#1 can communicate with
Generator#3 using Bluetooth. IT Wifi Zone is defined by the
access point (denoted by AP), which provides access to IT
Network for each authorized wireless device (e.g., the laptop)
within IT Wifi Zone. DNS Server is the name resolver in IT
Network, which uses a vulnerable DNS protocol and accepts
incoming communication from any host in IT Network.
The enterprise hosts, HMI, EWS, and historian are virtual
machines, that run a Windows Operating System, except for
the historian which runs Linux. The behavior of the boiler and
generators is simulated in the PLCs. In order to collect real
data from the testbed, we connect an instance of the prototype
system to each network switch (denoted by agent in Figure
5).
To ease readability, the graphs’ nodes are marked as follows:
blue nodes are associated with the system’s topology and
connectivity; red nodes are associated with vulnerabilities and
the attacker’s state; orange nodes are associated with software
and services; and purple nodes are associated with data flows.
In this section, we evaluate the attack scenarios presented
in Section V.
TABLE I: Information collected by the agent
Type Information collected Tools (Windows/Linux)
Topology IP address, netmask, etc. nmap
OS information Type and version nmap
Software and services
Network: port number, protocol, service name, etc. nmap, netstat
Local: ID, name, executable, user, etc. WMI / dpkg-query, rpm, ps (login)
Users and groups ID, name, type, access permissions, etc. WMI/passwd or sudo file (login)
Firewall Host-based firewall rules netstat firewall, advfirewall/ iptables-save, iptables-xml
Vulnerability CVE-ID, CVSS score, CWE, related CPEs, etc. OpenVAS, NVD
A. ARP Spoofing Attack
Commonly used in IP networks, ARP is also used in the OT
Network. For simplicity and readability of the attack graph,
we assume that the attacker has already managed to gain
access to the HMI in order to execute the attack. After placing
him/herself in the OT Network, the attacker can further exploit
the use of ARP to impersonate any of the components in
the subnet and eventually obtain a MITM position in the
communication between the components. The attack graph
presented in Figure 6 illustrates the attacker’s steps in this
attack scenario, where the attacker’s goal is to become a
MITM in the communication between EWS and PLC#1. Since
the attacker is located in HMI (nodes 7-9), which resides
in the OT network as EWS and PLC#1 (nodes 15, 18, 23),
he/she can access them both utilizing ARP that is used in
this subnet (nodes 5-6, 10-12, 29-32). Then, by exploiting the
vulnerable ARP bidirectional communication between EWS
and PLC#1 (nodes 19-20, 26, 33-34), the attacker is able to
impersonate both EWS and PLC#1 (nodes 3-4, 27-28). Finally,
as a result of this bidirectional spoofing which causes the entire
communication between EWS and PLC#1 to be routed via the
attacker, we infer that the attacker is a MITM (nodes 1-2).
1-2 mitmLink(attacker, ’EWS’,’PLC1’, ’HMI’)
3-4 spoofLinkHost(attacker, ’PLC1’, ’EWS’,
’HMI’, trafficTheft)
5-6 l2Access(attacker, ’HMI’, ’PLC1’, arp, ’OT
Network’,ipSubnet)
7-8 localAccess(attacker, ’HMI’, admin)
9 attackerLocated(’HMI’)
10-11 l2Connection(’HMI’, ’PLC1’, ’OT Network’,
arp, ipSubnet)
12 existingProtocol(’OT Network’, arp)
15 located(’PLC1’, ’OT Network’, ipSubnet)
18 located(’HMI’, ’OT Network’, ipSubnet)
19-20 vulLinkProtocol(’EWS’, ’PLC1’, arpSpoof-
ing, arp, adjacent, impersonateDst)
23 located(’EWS’, ’OT Network’, ipSubnet)
26 vulLinkProtocol(’OT Network’, arpSpoofing,
arp, adjacent, impersonateDst)
27-28 spoofLinkHost(attacker, ’EWS’, ’PLC1’,
’HMI’, trafficTheft)
29-30 l2Access(attacker, ’HMI’, ’EWS’, arp, ’OT
Network’, ipSubnet)
31-32 l2Connection(’HMI’, ’EWS’, ’OT Network’,
arp, ipSubnet)
33-34 vulLinkProtocol(’PLC1’, ’EWS’, arpSpoof-
ing, arp, adjacent, impersonateDst)
Fig. 6: MITM attack graph.
B. DNS Spoofing Attack
In this scenario, an attacker that placed his/her host in the
IT Wifi Zone, manages to connect to the IT Network via AP.
Then, the attacker exploits the vulnerable DNS protocol used
by DNS Server to poison its cache and bind Windows Server’s
naming to the attacker’s IP address; the next time that someone
queries for Windows Server’s address, the attacker’s IP will
be returned, and the user will communicate with the attacker
thinking it is really Windows Server.
The attack graph generated for this scenario is presented
in Figure 7. The attacker can become a part of IT Network
(nodes 10-11) by connecting to AP (nodes 15-17, 20, 23),
which is linked to that subnet. In so doing, the attacker can
communicate with DNS Server (nodes 3-4), since they are
both connected to the same subnet (nodes 5-6, 9-10), and the
attacker controls his/her device’s configuration (nodes 26-29).
Then, the attacker can exploit the vulnerability in the DNS
protocol (nodes 32-33) and execute the DNS spoofing attack.
1-2 spoofE2EHost(attacker, ’Windows Server’,
’Windows 7’, ’Attacker Laptop’, , , traffic-
Theft)
3-4 netAccess(attacker, ’Attacker Laptop’, ’DNS
Server’, dns, 53)
5-6 aclNW(’Attacker Laptop’, ’DNS Server’, dns,
53)
9 located(’DNS Server’, ’IT Network’, ipSub-
net)
10-11 located(’Attacker Laptop’, ’IT Network’, ip-
Subnet)
14 located(’AP’, ’IT Network’, ipSubnet)
15 isAP(’AP’, ’IT Wifi Zone’, ’IT Network’,
wep, secured)
16-17 l2Connection(’Attacker Laptop’, ’AP’, ’IT
Wifi Zone’, wep, wireless)
20 located(’Attacker Laptop’, ’IT Wifi Zone’,
physical)
23 isAuthenticated(attacker, ’Attacker Laptop’,
’AP’)
26 aclH(’Attacker Laptop’, admin, ’Attacker
Laptop’, ’DNS Server’, dns, 53)
27-27 localAccess(attacker, ’Attacker Laptop’, ad-
min)
29 attackerLocated(’Attacker Laptop’)
32 vulE2EProtocol(’DNS Server’, ’Windows 7’,
dnsCachePoisoning, dns, 53, remoteExploit,
dataFalsification, twoWay)
33 isNameResolver(’DNS Server’, ’Windows 7’,
’Windows Server’)
Fig. 7: DNS spoofing attack graph.
C. SYN Flooding Attack
SYN flooding is a network-based DoS attack in which an
attacker starts multiple TCP connections with the target host
but doesn’t complete them. In the vulnerable TCP implemen-
tation, the target host saves all of the half-open connections,
which eventually exhausts the host’s resources and makes it
unresponsive to other connections.
Within the testbed, the Historian supports remote connec-
tion via SSH, which relies on TCP, and contains a vulnerable
TCP implementation that allows the execution of the SYN
flooding attack. In this scenario we assume that the attacker
managed to gain access to Windows Server and execute the
attack from it. The attack graph for this scenario is presented
in Figure 8. The attacker, who is located on Windows Server
(nodes 16-18), can utilize it to start a TCP connection with
Historian on port 22 (nodes 3-4), since both the network-
based and the host’s host-based firewalls allow this connection
(nodes 5-6, 9, 12 15). The SSH service executed by Historian
(node 29) is vulnerable to the SYN flooding attack (nodes
20-22, 25), and together with the facts that (1) Historian
allows incoming communication from Windows Server on port
22 (node 28), and (2) the attacker is able to initiate this
communication (nodes 3-4), we conclude that the attacker can
perform an SYN flooding attack on Historian (nodes 1-2).
1-2 dos(attacker, ’Historian’)
3-4 netAccess(attacker, ’Windows Server’, ’Histo-
rian’, tcp, 22)
5-6 aclNW(’Windows Server’, ’Historian’, tcp,
22)
9 aclNW(’Windows Server’, ’OT Network’, tcp,
22)
12 located(’Historian’, ’OT Network’, ipSubnet)
15 aclH(’Windows Server’, admin, ’Windows
Server’, ’Historian’, tcp, 22)
16-17 localAccess(attacker, ’Windows Server’, ad-
min)
18 attackerLocated(’Windows Server’)
19 malicious(attacker)
20-21 vulHost(’Historian’, synFlood, ssh, remoteEx-
ploit, dos)
22 dependsOn(’Historian’, ssh, tcp)
25 vulHost(’Historian’, synFlood, tcp, remoteEx-
ploit, dos)
28 aclH(’Historian’, , ’Windows Server’, ’His-
torian’, tcp, 22)
29 networkService(’Historian’, ssh, tcp, 22, )
Fig. 8: SYN flooding attack graph.
D. WEP Cracking Attack
In this scenario, the attacker physically places his/her host
in the range of the access point (i.e., in IT Wifi Zone), which
is connected to IT Network. Based on the assumption that the
attacker’s host is adequately equipped to execute this attack,
we infer that the attacker can capture the wireless signals
transmitted in IT Wifi Zone. The access point uses WEP, which
has a known vulnerability that allows key extraction, as its
security protocol. One of Laptop’s uses is to browse emails
which results in communication with Windows Server.
The attack graph for this scenario is presented in Figure 9.
As can be seen, AP connects IT Network with IT Wifi Zone
(node 12). Since Windows Server is connected to AP in IT
Network (nodes 26-28, 31, 34), and Laptop can connect to
AP in IT Wifi Zone (nodes 11-12, 35-36, 39), we can infer
that AP is a relay to the communication between Laptop and
Windows Server (nodes 21-23). Since the attacker physically
located his/her device in IT Wifi Zone (nodes 3-5 and 8),
the attacker can capture the communication between Laptop
and Windows Server that is transmitted in the wireless zone
(nodes 45-46). Now, the attacker can exploit WEP’s the weak
encryption, which is used by AP (node 44), and perform
offline analysis on the captured traffic in order to extract AP’s
encryption key (nodes 40-41). There are two consequences of
1-2 accessDataFlow(attacker, emailFlow, read)
3-4 localAccess(attacker, ’Attacker Laptop’, admin)
5 attackerLocated(’Attacker Laptop’)
8 located(’Attacker Laptop’, ’IT Wifi Zone’, physical)
11 isAuthenticated(’LaptopUser’, ’Laptop’, ’AP’)
12 isAP(’AP’, ’IT Wifi Zone’,’IT Network’, wep, secured)
15 vulE2EProtocol(’Laptop’,’Windows Server’, unencrypted, smtp, 25, remoteExploit, eavesdrop-
ping, twoWay)
18 flowBind(emailFlow, smtp, 25)
21 dataFlow(’Laptop’, ’Windows Server’, emailFlow, twoWay)
22-23 relay(’AP’, emailFlow)
26-27 l2Connection(’AP’, ’Windows Server’, ’IT Network’, arp, ipSubnet)
28 existingProtocol(’IT Network’, arp)
31 located(’Windows Server’, ’IT Network’, ipSubnet)
34 located(’AP’, ’IT Network’, ipSubnet)
35-36 l2Connection(’Laptop’, ’AP’, ’IT Wifi Zone’, wep, wireless)
39 located(’Laptop’, ’IT Wifi Zone’, physical)
40-41 crackAPEncKey(attacker, ’AP’)
44 vulLinkProtocol(’IT Wifi Zone’, weakEncryption, wep, remoteExploit, keyExtraction)
45-46 accessDataFlow(attacker, emailFlow, view)
47 malicious(attacker)
48-49 isAuthenticated(attacker, ’Attacker Laptop’, ’AP’)
Fig. 9: WEP cracking attack graph.
this attack: (1) the attacker’s device is authenticated by AP,
thus he/she is able to communicate freely with other hosts in
IT Network (nodes 48-49); (2) the attacker can decipher the
communication between any host and AP (nodes 1-2, 18).
E. Bluetooth PIN Cracking Attack
In this attack scenario, the attacker uses his/her device
in order to capture the communication between two other
Bluetooth components, which enables the attacker to perform
the PIN cracking attack described in Subsection V-D.
In this scenario, the attacker is located in Bluetooth Zone
with Attacker Device that is able to capture Bluetooth com-
munication. The attack graph generated for this scenario is
presented in Figure 10. The attacker, who managed to place
his/her device in Bluetooth Zone (nodes 3-5 and 8), can
view the communication between PLC#1 and Generator#3
(nodes 25-30, 33, 36-37). Given that this communication is the
Bluetooth pairing process (nodes 19, 22), we can infer that the
attacker can perform the PIN cracking attack (nodes 17-18).
After executing this attack, the attacker has the encryption key
of the Bluetooth communication between PLC#1 and Gener-
ator#3 and can read their future communication (nodes 1-2,
11, 14). Since the extracted key is symmetric, the encryption
cracking also applies to the inverse communication direction
(nodes 16-15, 39-17).
1-2 accessDataFlow(attacker, statusUpdate, read)
3-4 localAccess(attacker, ’Attacker Device’, admin)
5 attackerLocated(’Attacker Device’)
8 located(’Attacker Device’, bluetoothZone, physical)
11 flowBind(statusUpdate, bluetooth, )
14 dataFlow(’Generator3’, ’PLC1’, statusUpdate,
oneWay)
15-16 crackPINCode(attacker, ’Generator3’, ’PLC1’)
17-18 crackPINCode(attacker, ’PLC1’,
’Generator3’)17-39
19 isPairingProcess(pairingProcessPlc1Gen3)
22 flowBind(pairingProcessPlc1Gen3, bluetooth, )
25 dataFlow(’PLC1’, ’Generator3’, pairingProcess-
Plc1Gen3, twoWay)
26-27 accessDataFlow(attacker, pairingProcessPlc1Gen3,
view)
28-29 l2Connection(’PLC1’, ’Generator3’, bluetoothZone,
bluetooth, wireless)
30 existingProtocol(bluetoothZone, bluetooth)
33 located(’Generator3’, bluetoothZone, physical)
36 located(’PLC1’, bluetoothZone, physical)
37 inDiscoveryMode(’Generator3’)
38 malicious(attacker)
Fig. 10: Bluetooth PIN cracking attack graph.
F. Bus Denial of Service Attack
To demonstrate attacks on the serial bus, we introduce the
Serial Bus component, which connects PLC#2, two more
generators (Generator#4 and Generator#5), and a third PLC
(PLC#3). The serial Modbus is the communication protocol
in this bus, and the master is PLC#2.
The attack graph generated for this attack scenario is pre-
sented in Figure 11. The attacker is located in HMI (nodes 24-
26), which can communicate with other components connected
to OT Network, in particular with PLC#2 on port 22 (nodes 11-
14, 17, 20, 23). PLC#2 enables remote login via SSH service
(nodes 7, 27). The attacker that managed to obtain PLC#2’s
admin account (node 30) can now connect to it on port 22,
since inbound communication from HMI is allowed (node 10),
enabling the attacker to gain local access (nodes 5-6).
PLC#2 and Generator#4 can communicate via the bus using
the Modbus protocol (nodes 31-33, 36, 39). Since the attacker
has local access to PLC#2 (node 5), we infer that he/she can
abuse it to access Generator#4 via the bus (nodes 3-4) and
thus deny service to Generator#4 (nodes 1-2).
G. Bus Spoofing Attacks
The Modbus protocol used in Serial Bus is a master/slave
communication protocol. In this type of communication, only
one component (referred to as the master) is responsible for
managing the operation of the other components (referred to
as slaves) by sending command messages; the slaves only
respond to the master’s commands.
The first spoofing attack scenario is focused on imper-
sonating the bus master. We demonstrate how an attacker
located in PLC#3 can exploit the lack of authentication in the
serial Modbus protocol and impersonate the master of the bus
(PLC#2) in order to send fake commands to Generator#4. The
attack graph representing this scenario is presented in Figure
12a.
PLC#3 and Generator#4 can communicate via the bus
(nodes 7-9, 12, 15). PLC#2 and Generator#4 can also commu-
1-2 dos(attacker, ’Generator4’)
3-4 l2Access(attacker, ’PLC2’, ’Generator4’, modbus,
’Serial Bus’, bus)
5-6 localAccess(attacker, ’PLC2’, admin)
7 isLoginService(ssh)
10 aclH(’PLC2’, admin, ’HMI’, ’PLC2’,tcp, 22)
11-12 netAccess(attacker, ’HMI’, ’PLC2’, tcp, 22)
13-14 aclNW(’HMI’, ’PLC2’, tcp, 22)
17 located(’PLC2’, ’OT Network’, ipSubnet)
20 located(’HMI’, ’OT Network’, ipSubnet)
23 aclH(’HMI’, admin, ’HMI’, ’PLC2’, tcp, 22)
24-25 localAccess(attacker, ’HMI’, admin)
26 attackerLocated(’HMI’)
27 networkService(’PLC2’, ssh, tcp, 22, admin)
30 hasAccount(attacker, ’PLC2’, admin)
31-32 l2Connection(’PLC2’, ’Generator4’, ’Serial Bus’,
modbus, bus)
33 existingProtocol(’Serial Bus’, modbus)
36 located(’Generator4’, ’Serial Bus’, bus)
39 located(’PLC2’, ’Serial Bus’, bus)
40 malicious(attacker)
Fig. 11: Bus denial of service attack graph.
nicate via the bus using Modbus, which lacks authentication
(nodes 12, 16-17, 20, 23). The attacker can exploit his/her
access to the bus via PLC#3 (nodes 4-6, 15) and Modbus’s
vulnerability and impersonate PLC#2 (the master) against
Generator#4 (nodes 1-3).
The second spoofing attack is focused on spoofing as a slave
(Generator#5) in order to provide a fake response to the master
(PLC#2). The attack graph (see Figure 12b) is quite similar
to the master spoofing scenario; the only difference is that we
require the source of the vulnerable communication (node 16)
to be a slave in the bus (node 3).
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduce an extended network modeling
for the MulVAL framework and evaluated it in an opera-
tional testbed simulating a simplified thermal power plant
process. The proposed modeling considers the physical net-
work topology, supports short-range communication protocols,
and models specific industrial communication architectures.
Furthermore, we model various network attacks, including
bus spoofing, WEP cracking, Bluetooth PIN cracking, ARP
spoofing, and DNS spoofing.
In future work, we plan to (1) extend the capabilities of
the prototype system to support the automatic extraction of
additional facts (such as obtaining information about wireless
devices); (2) model additional network protocols (such as
Zigbee and BLE), wireless communication types (e.g., cellular
communication) including the modeling of device mobility,
and attack techniques; and (3) develop a process which utilizes
the attack graph generated according to the extended modeling
we presented in this paper to associate attack graph nodes with
potential mitigation actions, resulting in a countermeasure plan
that reduces the potential risk to the system.
1-2 spoofLinkHost(attacker, ’PLC2’, ’Generator4’, ’PLC3’,
deception)
3 isMaster(’PLC2’, ’Serial Bus’)
4-5 localAccess(attacker, ’PLC3’, admin)
6 attackerLocated(’PLC3’)
7-8 l2Connection(’PLC3’, ’Generator4’, ’Serial Bus’, mod-
bus, bus)
9 existingProtocol(’Serial Bus’, modbus)
12 located(’Generator4’, ’Serial Bus’, bus)
15 located(’PLC3’, ’Serial Bus’, bus)
16-17 vulLinkProtocol(’PLC2’, ’Generator4’, noAuthentication,
modbus, adjacent, impersonateSrc)
20 located(’PLC2’, ’Serial Bus’, bus)
23 vulLinkProtocol(’Serial Bus’, noAuthentication, modbus,
adjacent, impersonateSrc)
(a) Spoofing as bus master attack graph.
1-2 spoofLinkHost(attacker, ’Generator5’, ’PLC2’, ’PLC3’,
deception)
3 isSlave(’Generator5’, ’Serial Bus’)
4-5 localAccess(attacker, ’PLC3’, admin)
6 attackerLocated(’PLC3’)
7-8 l2Connection(’PLC3’, ’PLC2’, ’Serial Bus’, modbus,
bus)
9 existingProtocol(’Serial Bus’, modbus)
12 located(’PLC2’, ’Serial Bus’, bus)
15 located(’PLC3’, ’Serial Bus’, bus)
16-17 vulLinkProtocol(’Generator5’, ’PLC2’, noAuthentication,
modbus, adjacent, impersonateSrc)
20 located(’Generator5’, ’Serial Bus’, bus)
23 vulLinkProtocol(’Serial Bus’, noAuthentication, modbus,
adjacent, impersonateSrc)
(b) Spoofing as bus slave attack graph.
Fig. 12: Bus spoofing attack graphs.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Phillips and L. P. Swiler, “A graph-based system for network-
vulnerability analysis,” in Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New
security paradigms. ACM, 1998, pp. 71–79.
[2] O. Sheyner, J. Haines, S. Jha, R. Lippmann, and J. M. Wing, “Automated
generation and analysis of attack graphs,” in Security and privacy, 2002.
Proceedings. 2002 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2002, pp. 273–284.
[3] S. Jajodia, S. Noel, and B. O’Berry, Topological Analysis of Network
Attack Vulnerability. Springer US, 2005, pp. 247–266.
[4] K. Ingols, R. Lippmann, and K. Piwowarski, “Practical attack graph
generation for network defense,” in Computer Security Applications
Conference, 2006. ACSAC’06. 22nd Annual. IEEE, 2006, pp. 121–
130.
[5] X. Ou, W. F. Boyer, and M. A. McQueen, “A scalable approach to
attack graph generation,” in Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security. ACM, 2006, pp. 336–345.
[6] X. Ou, S. Govindavajhala, and A. W. Appel, “Mulval: A logic-based
network security analyzer.” in USENIX Security Symposium. Baltimore,
MD, 2005, pp. 8–8.
[7] “NVD national vulnerability database,” http://www.nvd.nist.gov, [On-
line].
[8] “Nessus security scanner,” http://www.nessus.org, [Online].
[9] J. C. Acosta, E. Padilla, and J. Homer, “Augmenting attack graphs
to represent data link and network layer vulnerabilities,” in Military
Communications Conference, MILCOM 2016-2016 IEEE. IEEE, 2016,
pp. 1010–1015.
[10] L. P. Swiler, C. Phillips, D. Ellis, and S. Chakerian, “Computer-attack
graph generation tool,” in discex. IEEE, 2001, p. 1307.
[11] R. W. Ritchey and P. Ammann, “Using model checking to analyze
network vulnerabilities,” in Security and Privacy, 2000. S&P 2000.
Proceedings. 2000 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2000, pp. 156–165.
[12] R. Ritchey, B. O’Berry, and S. Noel, “Representing tcp/ip connectivity
for topological analysis of network security,” in Computer Security
Applications Conference, 2002. Proceedings. 18th Annual. IEEE, 2002,
pp. 25–31.
[13] S. Jha, O. Sheyner, and J. Wing, “Two formal analyses of attack graphs,”
in Proceedings 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop.
CSFW-15, June 2002, pp. 49–63.
[14] P. Ammann, D. Wijesekera, and S. Kaushik, “Scalable, graph-
based network vulnerability analysis,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’02.
ACM, 2002, pp. 217–224. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/586110.586140
[15] “Common vulnerabilities and exposures dictionary.” http://www.cve.
mitre.com, [Online].
[16] S. Yi, Y. Peng, Q. Xiong, T. Wang, Z. Dai, H. Gao, J. Xu, J. Wang,
and L. Xu, “Overview on attack graph generation and visualization
technology,” in Anti-counterfeiting, security and identification (asid),
2013 IEEE international conference on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–6.
[17] S. Jajodia, S. Noel, P. Kalapa, M. Albanese, and J. Williams, “Cauldron
mission-centric cyber situational awareness with defense in depth,” in
2011 - MILCOM 2011 Military Communications Conference, Nov 2011,
pp. 1339–1344.
[18] “Cauldron, a cost-effective, nimble, adaptable and automated network vi-
sualization and modeling tool,” https://cyvision.net/cauldron/, [Online].
[19] “Firemon,” http://firemon.com, [Online].
[20] “Skybox security,” http://www.skyboxsecurity.com, [Online].
[21] E. Bacic, M. Froh, and G. Henderson, “Mulval extensions for dy-
namic asset protection,” CINNABAR NETWORKS INC OTTAWA
(ONTARIO), Tech. Rep., 2006.
[22] M. J. Froh and G. Henderson, MulVAL extensions II. Defence R & D
Canada-Ottawa, 2009.
[23] X. Ou and A. W. Appel, A logic-programming approach to network
security analysis. Princeton University Princeton, 2005.
[24] S. Fluhrer, I. Mantin, and A. Shamir, “Weaknesses in the key scheduling
algorithm of rc4,” in Selected Areas in Cryptography, S. Vaudenay and
A. M. Youssef, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2001, pp. 1–24.
[25] M. Vanhoef and F. Piessens, “Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce
reuse in wpa2,” in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2017, pp. 1313–1328.
[26] ——, “Advanced wi-fi attacks using commodity hardware,” in Proceed-
ings of the 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference.
ACM, 2014, pp. 256–265.
[27] Y. Shaked and A. Wool, “Cracking the bluetooth pin,” in Proceedings of
the 3rd International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and
Services, ser. MobiSys ’05. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2005, pp. 39–
50. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1067170.1067176
APPENDIX A
COMPARISON BETWEEN MULVAL EXTENSIONS
Work Vulnerability Modeling Host Modeling Network Modeling Data Modeling User Modeling Safeguard Modeling
Ou et al.
[6]
(baseline)
Characterized by exploitation
range (local or remote) and
consequence (impacting CIA,
DoS, or privilege escalation);
Associated with a specific
program running on a host
Characterized by
running programs
Connectivity among
hosts is represented by
the hacl predicate which
is an abstraction of
routing information and
access controls
Associated with paths
in a specific host and
principals’ access to
files
User accounts to hosts
and their privileges;
Principal characteristic
(malicious or
incompetent)
–
Bacic et
al. [21] –
Model host classification
(derived from the assets
it contains) and software
availability
Model subnets and
inter-subnet
communication
Model assets/data
value (in terms of
CIA) and classification
Model principal’s
clearance level –
Froh et al.
[22] –
Model the value of IT
services (in terms of
CIA) and associate them
with host and program
Associate hosts to
networks; Represent
network components
(routers)
Model assets/data
value (in terms of
CIA)
–
Represent security
requirements (e.g.,
applicationAccount)
and incorporate them
in the interaction
rules; Consider their
(or other primitives)
absence an indication
to safeguard
deployment
Liu et al.
[?]
Represent vulnerability
exploitation based on
evidence collected from hosts
– – – – –
Acosta et
al. [9]
Model ARP spoofing attack;
Model null/weak
authentication in OLSR
–
Model network
components (gateways;
Model cross-subnet
network access
Represent data flows
(traffic generated by a
user in a specific
protocol that is
exchanged between
two hosts)
– –
Our
approach
Represent protocol design
vulnerabilities; Represent data
vulnerabilities (e.g., lack of
encryption); Model spoofing
attacks, MITM, DoS, and
attacks on wireless and bus
communication
Represent local services
Represent hosts
connectivity at different
network layers;
Represent wireless and
serial communications;
Distinguish between host
and network-based
firewall rules
Represent specific data
types (e.g.,
credentials);
Distinguish between
data at rest and data in
motion
Represent user access
to hosts at different
network layers
–
APPENDIX B
COMPLETE INPUT FOR THE MULVAL EXAMPLE
1 /* attacker state and goals */
2 attackerLocated(internet).
3 attackGoal(execCode(dbServer,_)).
4 malicious(attacker).
5 /* host connectivity */
6 hacl(internet, dbServer, tcp, 1521).
7 hacl(internet, host1, tcp, 80).
8 hacl(internet, host2, tcp, 80).
9 hacl(internet, host3, tcp, 80).
10 hacl(host1, dbServer, _, _).
11 hacl(host2, dbServer, _, _).
12 hacl(host3, dbServer, _, _).
13 hacl(dbServer, host1, _, _).
14 hacl(dbServer, host2, _, _).
15 hacl(dbServer, host3, _, _).
16 hacl(dbServer, host1, _, _).
17 hacl(host2, host1, _, _).
18 hacl(host3, host1, _, _).
19 hacl(host1, dbServer, _, _).
20 hacl(host1, host2, _, _).
21 hacl(host1, host3, _, _).
22 hacl(dbServer, host2, _, _).
23 hacl(host1, host2, _, _).
24 hacl(host3, host2, _, _).
25 hacl(host2, dbServer, _, _).
26 hacl(host2, host1, _, _).
27 hacl(host2, host3, _, _).
28 hacl(dbServer, host3, _, _).
29 hacl(host2, host3, _, _).
30 hacl(host1, host3, _, _).
31 hacl(host3, dbServer, _, _).
32 hacl(host3, host2, _, _).
33 hacl(host3, host1, _, _).
34 /* vulnerability information */
35 vulExists(dbServer, 'CVE-2012-3132', oracleDB).
36 vulProperty('CVE-2012-3132', remoteExploit, privEscalation).
37 networkServiceInfo(dbServer ,oracleDB, tcp ,1521 ,root).
38 /* victims host configurations */
39 hasAccount(user, victim, localAdmin).
40 inCompetent(user).
APPENDIX C
FACT GENERATION METHODS
Fact Generation method Description
isLoginService Knowledge, Manual Utilizing common knowledge or expert input to classify a service as a login service. For example: SSH and Remote
Desktop are known services that enable users to log in to a machine.
networkService Assumption, Scan Identifying network services directly from scan results. If the Protocol or Port arguments could not be detected, they
are set to unknown; if the User argument is not detected, it is set to a wildcard.
localService Scan Identify local services directly from host scans.
isCredential Assumption, Manual
Categorize data as containing credentials, for example: if some host runs a program that is defined as both isLoginService
and networkService, an isCredential fact is generated for each existing hasAccount fact involving that host to indicate
that the login data flow contains credentials (i.e., the remote login attempt): the User and Host arguments get the values
of the User and Host arguments of hasAccount predicate, and the DataName argument is set to ”user hostCredentials”
(where user and host correspond to the User and Host arguments of hasAccount predicate).
dataFlow, flowBind Knowledge, Manual Generate data flows according to common knowledge, for example: the port number can provide an indication about
the protocol used to send some data flow.
dataBind Assumption, Knowledge
Associating data with a specific path, for example: we know that a DNS server holds an IP to naming mapping in its
cache, but we cannot get this memory mapping from a scan. Thus, in order to represent this knowledge, this data is
associated with a generic representation of this path.
existingProtocol Scan, Manual Specify which protocol is used within different parts of the network (e.g., the usage of ARP within a subnet) directly
from scan results or from expert’s input.
located Scan Identify the position of each device in the network directly from scan results.
vulLinkProtocol, vulE2EProtocol Knowledge Associate protocol vulnerabilities to communications identified in the network by using a predefined knowledge base
(e.g., NIST NVD).
vulHost Scan Identify the vulnerabilities in each host directly from scan results (e.g., using Nessus).
vulData Manual Associate vulnerabilities with data (e.g., unencrypted or unsinged) based on expert’s input.
hasAccount Assumption, Scan
Associate user accounts to hosts directly from scans. If the Principal argument could not be detected, it is set to:
”host nameUser” (where host name is the value of the Host argument); if the User argument could not be detected, it
is set to admin.
localAccess Assumption, Scan Infer a principal’s access to hosts directly from scans. If the Principal argument could not be detected, it is set as the
hasAccount predicate.
aclNW Assumption, Scan Infer network-based firewall rules directly from scans. If a networkService fact with an unknown protocol and port was
generated, a corresponding aclNW with an unknown protocol and port arguments is generated.
aclH Assumption, Scan Infer host-based firewall rules directly from scans. Similar to aclNW; if a network service with an unknown protocol
and port was generated, a corresponding aclH is generated, and the User argument is set to a wildcard.
